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Reconsidering
The Church’s Constitution
William Hordern
President Emeritus,

Lutheran Theological Seminary, Saskatoon

As a member of the Merger Commission 1, I was asked to
write this article to answer the question: “In light of the experience of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada (ELCIC),
where do you think the Commission could have improved its
Constitution?”
With the advantage of hindsight it is never difficult to see
where improvements could have been made. It is one thing
to sit around a table, as the Merger Commission did, to plan
a church. It is quite another thing to see a church in action.
Nonetheless, I would like to begin by saying that I do believe
that the Merger Commission did many things that were right.
For example, since the ELCIC came into being in 1985, it has
lost only a handful of congregations and most of these were
already considering leaving their church before the merger. If
one studies the history of church mergers, it is evident that
most of them have resulted in the loss of many more congregations. The Merger Commission can take satisfaction from
doing many things right.
Recent events have displayed a major weakness in the way
in which the ELCIC was constituted. The May 1994 issue of
Canada Lutheran, the national magazine of the ELCIC, reported that, because of financial reasons, the National Council
of the ELCIC had to make severe cuts to programs. The positions of the Executive directors of the Divisions for Church
and Society and World Mission were eliminated. A cutback in
funds for the division boards means that they will meet only
once a year. These actions cannot but result in a serious decline
in the programs and mission of the ELCIC.
In large part, this situation results from the failure of the
Merger Commission to constitute a strong national church.
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The synods obviously have more power than the national
One might even argue that we built five churches
church.
rather than one. Ted Jacobson, President of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Canada 2^ argued again and again in
the Merger Commission that we needed to build a strong national church. The response to him was that we wanted to

—

build a strong church at every level national, synodical and
congregational. But the national church has not proved to be
strong.

There are several reasons for this. The Merger Commission
up five Synods. The size of ELCIC’s membership makes
this unrealistic. Synod offices are expensive to run and the
small constituency of the ELCIC cannot afford five of them. If
there had been fewer Synods, many of the functions performed
by Synods could be handled by the Conferences^. This would
be less expensive since Conferences do not operate with fulltime employees. Other churches have operated successfully on
this basis. At one point the Commission seriously considered
having only two Synods, one in the East and one in the West.
set

In light of history, this idea has considerable merit.

The Commission also decided that the flow of financial
funds should go from congregations to Synods to the National
Church. This has resulted in Synods cutting back on the funds
sent to the National Church in order to preserve synodical programs. The same issue of Canada Lutheran reported that during the years 1986 to 1992 congregational income increased by
27%, synodical income increased by 9% while the income sent
to the National Church decreased by 5%. Control of finances
results in power and thus the Synods are more powerful than
the National Church.
Faced with the cutbacks to the National Church, Bishop
Telmor Sartison (the national Bishop), expressed the seriousness of the problem. He said, “It comes down to the issue of
mission and ministry. Are we a people in mission? Are we sent
and going?”
When the Merger Commission was designing the ELCIC
it would have been easy to reduce the number of Synods but
today that will be very difficult to do. Once a Synod has come
into being inevitably it is motivated to defend its own turf. The
same issue of Canada Lutheran that reported the financial cutbacks also reported that the Manitoba-Northwestern Ontario

Constitution
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Synod voted down a proposal that would only have explored
the implications of a merger with the Saskatchewan Synod. A
similar attitude can be expected from the other Synods.
Another problem has to do with the bishops. The Commission desired to have bishops serve as “pastors to the pastors”. This was an important reason for naming them “bishops” rather than “presidents”. The term “bishop”, it was argued, is an ecclesiastical term whereas “president” is a secular
term. The term “bishop” was to signify the pastoral nature of
the

office.

Inasmuch as the bishops play an important role in the calling of pastors, there was an obvious problem. Would pastors
be ready to bring their problems to a person who has considerable power over where they may be called, or even whether
they will be called at all?
But the Constitution made it even more difficult for bishops to act as pastors to pastors. The problem is in 111:12 of
the Bylaws. Items a-f outline the normal procedure for discipline of an ordained minister. The Synod bishop shall, upon
learning of reasons for discipline, “investigate such matters,
counsel with the minister and seek to remove any cause for
complaint” If counselling fails, the bishop may appoint an investigating committee. The bishop is to be a member of the
investigating committee. This committee decides whether or
not there should be a disciplinary committee which may call for
censure and admonition by the bishop or by the Synod council
or suspension or removal from the clergy roster.
This procedure gives a central role to the bishop in matters
of discipline. The bishop is named as the one to investigate
charges, and to both appoint and serve on the investigating
committee. Can pastors see as their pastor one who has such
powers of disciplinary action?
Section 12 h makes matters even worse. It allows the bishop
to suspend the pastor before the charges are investigated or
handled by the investigating and disciplinary committees. It
names certain situations under which this procedure may be
.

followed: “obvious heresy or flagrant immorality, or

if the accused shall have admitted guilt or absconded”.
These seem fairly logical. But the item goes on to say, “If
the circumstances are such that, in the opinion of the bishop
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of the synod, the church would suffer injury if the accused
continued to exercise the office of the ordained ministry dur-

ing the progress of the disciplinary procedure, the bishop may
immediately suspend the accused....” This provision gives the
bishop the absolute power to act unilaterally and suspend a
pastor. Later, there will be a disciplinary hearing, but when
such action has been taken by the bishop, there is an obvious

implication of guilt already established. The pastor is likely to
feel it is a matter of “We shall give you a fair trial and then you
will be hanged”. The bishops themselves should be reluctant
to see this article retained. Action under it leaves the bishop
open to legal action. If indeed the situation is this serious,
surely some committee should be able to act and bear the responsibility for it. However, the presence of this power in the
hands of the bishop makes it most unlikely that pastors will
conhde in the bishop as their pastor when they have serious
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problems.
In practice bishops have often acted as pastors to pastors.
But where this has occurred, it has been in spite of the con-

'

i

powers given to bishops. And it is certain that the
constitutional powers have kept many other pastors from turnstitutional

|

ing to a bishop for pastoral help.
If we had wanted the bishops to be administrators and disci-

makes some sense although it
should not have given such autocratic powers to bishops. This
would, of course, fit in with the historic meaning of the term
“bishop”. But if that is what we wanted we should not have
talked so much about the bishops as pastors to the pastors.
When the Merger Commission was meeting, we were not as
sensitive to individual rights as we are today. As a result, the
constitution does not protect the rights of an accused pastor
in a satisfactory manner.
There are problems with the investigating and disciplinary
committees in the Constitution. The investigating committee
is appointed by the bishop. The disciplinary committee is appointed by the Synod Council and the bishop of the Church.
In secular law the accused, through his or her lawyer, has the
right to veto certain suggested jurors. Our Constitution does
not give the accused pastor any right to challenge the appointment of the committee members who act as the jury in the
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In the case of the investigating committee, the bishop acts
both to bring the charges and to appoint those who will hear
them. And the bishop is a member of the investigating com-

This is a conflict of interest. The bishop acts as the
prosecuting attorney and also serves on the jury. Inasmuch
as the disciplinary committee is chosen by the Synod Council
and the bishop of the Church, there is less obvious conflict of
interest. But in both cases the accused ought to have a right
to challenge appointees that may have reason to be biased towards the accused.
It might be argued that in a Christian church such biases
are out of place. They are. But, as Luther saw so clearly, the
Christian is always at one and the same time both justified
and sinful. An accused pastor certainly should have the same
right as an accused person in a secular court has to reject any
mittee.
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he or she believes would be biased.
The Lutheran Confessions give a central place to the congregations. The church is defined in the Augsburg Confession
as “the assembly of all believers among whom the Gospel is
preached in its purity and the holy sacraments are administered according to the Gospel”. ^ This means that the congregation is the primary form of the church’s existence because it
is the place where normally believers assemble for the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments.
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also practical reasons for the

primacy of the con-

church are supported, finandally and otherwise, by the congregations. Therefore, one of
the major concerns of the Reformers was that the congregation should have the right to call its pastor(s).^ Ordination of
pastors should come only after the call.
gregation. All other levels of the

The Constitution of the ELCIC is basically in keeping with
but at some points there are problems. Article VI section

this

I affirms the power of the congregations to call pastors but it
adds “after consulting with the bishop of the synod”. This creates questions as to authority. What the Merger Commission
had in mind was that the bishop’s office is a clearing house for
calls. It is aware of which pastors might be open to a call and
it is aware of the abilities of pastors and the need of congregations. In most cases, the congregation is happy to have such

help.
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Nonetheless, as written, the Constitution can be interpreted
to mean that the bishop gives the congregation the permission to call. This would be contrary to the Confessions which
clearly affirm that it is not the bishop but God who gives the
congregation the right to call. I was a member of a congregation of the American Lutheran Church that decided to set up
its own search committee to find a pastor. The district president was deeply offended at not having first been consulted.
But the ALC constitution did not prohibit the action of the
congregation. Would this be permissible under the ELCIC
Constitution?
Recently I spoke with a layperson who was deeply concerned
about the call procedure in his congregation. The Call Committee met with the bishop and one candidate was selected,
The congregation was given only the option of voting yes or
not to the selected pastor. The layperson said, “In the former
USSR the Communist Party selected candidates and the people could only vote yes or no. We called this an example of

undemocratic and dictatorial action. What do we call it when
the same thing occurs in the Lutheran church?” Obviously, if

we

are to preserve the Reformers’ concern that the congrega-

its pastor, the congregation must have
a greater opportunity to make the decision.
The March, 1994 issue of Canada Lutheran had an article
about unemployed pastors. Letters to later issues indicate that
this is not an isolated problem. Why are these pastors unemployed? The ELCIC has a great many vacant parishes. If more
congregations took the initiative to search out pastors for call

tion has the right to call

would

it

relieve this situation?

The ELCIC Constitution makes it clear that ordination depends upon a person having received a call which, in most
comes from a congregation. However, the disciplinary
process for pastors does not give the congregation any right
to be involved in the disciplinary process. This is a serious
limitation upon the power of the congregation.
I know of a congregation that was deeply angered when the
bishop (acting under article III section 12, h. of the Bylaws
described above) suspended a pastor without any consultation
with the congregation. When members of the congregation
asked to whom they could appeal the action, they were told
that they could not appeal it. The congregation was split as
cases,
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a result and some members
also the
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not only the congregation but

ELCIC.

In practice, as this case demonstrates, a congregation is
angered when its chosen pastor is removed without it having
any way of being involved in the decision. It feels that it has
been bypassed by dictatorial action. It is particularly offended
to find that it has no recourse of appeal and does not even
know why its pastor is suspended.
When I was a member of Trinity Lutheran Church in Skokie,
Illinois, the pastor was accused of heresy. Dr. Frederick Schiotz,
President of the ALC, came to our congregation. He called a
meeting of the congregation’s board, open to interested members of the congregation. He explained fully the nature of the
charges and their gravity. He explained how they would be
investigated and allowed the congregation to express opinions.
The congregation felt good about the process and knew that
it was consulted and involved. The pastor was cleared of the
charges but even if he had been removed by disciplinary action,
the congregation would have felt that it had been done fairly
and that they had been consulted. This contrasts sharply with
what has happened under the ELCIC’s Constitution.
The Bylaws should be amended so that the congregation
is given a part to play in the discipline of the pastor that it
has called. In many cases, perhaps most, the congregation will
be involved in disciplinary action inasmuch as the charges will
have come from the congregation in the first place. However,
the Constitution allows, even in such cases, for the disciplinary
process to go forward without the congregation being further
involved. For both theological reasons and for practical reasons, the congregation ought to have the constitutional right
to be involved in disciplinary procedures of pastors whom it
has called.
The flow of financial funds, as described above, is a limitation on the power of the congregation. Some congregations,
I know, would prefer to send funds to both the synod and
to the national church. Many people in the congregations today are dismayed to see world missions and social concerns
deprived of their executive directors. Such people would like
to decide what proportion of their funds should go to the National Church rather than leaving the division of the funds to
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the Synod. This seems to be a serious limitation on the power
of the congregations.
It was often said in the Merger Commission that it was not
writing the Constitution in stone. It could always be changed
by the Church. That is often easier said than done. The ELCIC
has made some changes in the Constitution but mostly they
have amounted to tinkering rather than to major surgery. Has
the time come for major surgery?

NOTES
^

The Commission

responsible for the formation of the Evangelical

Lutheran Church In Canada.
2 The ELCIC was formed in 1985 through the merger of the Canadian sections of two North American Lutheran Churches, the Lutheran Church
in America and the American Lutheran Church. The Canadian section of the latter had already acted to become an autonomous Canadian Church in 1960, naming itself the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Canada.
^ Geographical units in the ELCIC are called Synods. The five Synods are
British Columbia, Alberta and the Territories, Saskatchewan, Manitoba
and Northwestern Ontario, and Eastern (which extends from Thunder
Bay, Ontario to Halifax, Nova Scotia). Each Synod is divided into a

number

of Conferences.

The Book of Concord^ edited and translated by Theodore G. Tappert
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959) 32.
5 E.g., Ibid. 331-332.

